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What is sender ID spoofing?

Last reviewed 1 min readReviewed by BroadNet engineering
Quick answer

Sender ID spoofing is sending an SMS with a falsified originator — appearing as `BANK-OF-X`, `DHL`, `MyBrand` when the sender has no authorisation to use that string. It is the SMS equivalent of email phishing, and it is the dominant vector for smishing attacks globally. The protocol weakness: GSM SMS has no end-to-end sender authentication, so the SMSC accepts whatever sender ID the originating ESME submits.

Plain-language definitionVendor-neutralReviewed September 26, 2026
DiagramWhere an SMS firewall sits in the operator network
  1. Inbound A2P and interconnect trafficFrom aggregators and international partners
  2. SMS firewallInspects every message in real time
  3. Operator SMSCOnly clean traffic is delivered
  4. Subscriber handset
  • Grey routes, spoofed sender IDs and spam are blocked
  • Legitimate A2P traffic is identified and billed
The long answer

Everything worth knowing, nothing that isn't.

§01

How attackers spoof

Three patterns. They submit through a weakly-governed aggregator that doesn't enforce sender-ID whitelisting against registered owners (this should never happen, but happens). They route through a foreign SS7 path that bypasses local sender-ID checks (mostly closed by FS.07-aligned firewalls). They abuse SIM-box infrastructure to send from a real MSISDN that they then alphanumeric-overlay with a fake brand string (some aggregator stacks allow this).

§02

How operators defend

Sender-ID registration (the foundational defence). Outbound sender-ID enforcement at the aggregator: BroadNet's submission gateway rejects any submit_sm whose alphanumeric sender field is not in the customer's approved sender-ID whitelist for the destination country. Inbound sender-ID validation at the operator firewall: cross-check incoming A2P traffic's claimed sender against the registered owner per country.

§03

What buyers should expect from their aggregator

Strict whitelisting. If your aggregator lets you set the sender ID to any arbitrary string at API-call time without prior approval, that aggregator is a smishing risk to the rest of the ecosystem. Reputable aggregators require sender-ID pre-registration. Period.

§04

Regulatory state

MENA regulators (TDRA, CST, NTRA, TRC) have been increasingly aggressive on sender-ID spoofing. Operators in EU markets are deploying SMS-Sender-ID validation under EU NIS2 frameworks. RCS Business Messaging is gradually replacing trust-critical SMS exactly because the sender is cryptographically verified.

BNWritten by the BroadNet engineering team·Operating carrier-grade messaging since 2003, headquartered in Dubai·Editorial standards
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$ curl -X POST https://api.broadnet.me/sms/sendSms
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Test-access requestsReply within 1 business day
Production24 / 7 · < 15 min
Operator NOC24 / 7 · pager